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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

nor riparian owners can interfere with their use. When the United
States does not hold title to land upon which navigable waters lie,
ownership determination of the navigable waters and the soil beneath
them lies with states.
The court stated that the district court correctly identified the
elements of the test for navigability: "a navigable waterway of the
United States must (1) be or have been; (2) used to susceptible of use;
(3) in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; (4) as a
highway for interstate commerce."
Due to the lack of evidence on the navigability of the West Fork of
the Stones River, aside from the notice by the Corps, the court
reversed the ruling of the trial court and remanded for determination
by the trier of fact based on evidence relevant to that determination.
The court stated if the West Fork of the Stones River was
determined navigable, the riverbed was not subject to private
ownership. As a result, Hardy would not be entitled to compensation
of the condemned land below the low-water mark. In Tennessee,
grants of land along navigable streams extend to the low-water mark
only, and tide to the streambed remains with the state. If the waterway
is navigable, the soil covered by water and the use of the stream
belongs to the public. Therefore, any deed Hardy had only conveyed
property extending to the low-water mark.
Rachel M. Sobrero
TEXAS
Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 00-0436, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 13
(Tex. February 14, 2002) (holding that the Edwards Aquifer
Authority's adoption of well-permitting rules falls within the exception
to the Property Rights Act for actions taken under a political
subdivision's statutory authority to prevent waste or protect rights of
owners of interest in groundwater).
Upon being denied a permit application for one of their two pecan
orchards, Glenn and JoLynn Bragg ("Braggs") brought suit against the
Edwards Aquifer Authority ("Authority") and its general manager.
The Edwards Aquifer Act ("EAA") created the Authority to manage
groundwater withdrawals from the aquifer through a permit system.
The EAA charged the Authority with carrying out the state legislature's
mandate of conservation. The legislature anticipated that an increased
withdrawal of water from the aquifer could cause a drought with
potentially devastating effects.
The issue in the case hinged on the Authority's adoption of rules
governing the issuance of well permits. The permit system gave
preference to "existing users," which the EAA defined as people who
withdrew and beneficially used the aquifer on or before June 1, 1993.
The Braggs only accessed the aquifer by means of a well on one of
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their orchards, Home Place, prior to 1993; they did not drill a well for
the other orchard, D'Hanis, until 1995. Based upon the fact that the
Braggs did not qualify as existing users for the D'Hanis orchard, their
permit application was denied. The Braggs brought suit because they
could not grow pecans in commercial quantities with the single permit
granted for Home Place.
The Property Rights Act ("PRA") provided for a cause of action for
real property owners if there was governmental action taken without
preparing a takings impact assessment ("TIA"). The Braggs argued
that pursuant to the PRA, the Authority was required to prepare a TIA
before promulgating rules governing aquifer permits, and before
applying those rules to the Braggs' pending application.
Since the PRA applied to "governmental entities," including
political subdivisions, and the Authority was considered a political
subdivision, the Braggs maintained that the Authority's promulgation
of rules constituted a government action that was subject to the PRA.
The trial court found the Authority's well-permitting rules and the
proposed actions on the Braggs' permit application were void because
the Authority did not prepare a TIA. The court of appeals vacated in
part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed.
The Supreme Court concluded that based upon the FAA, the
Authority was not required to prepare a TIA. The Court recognized
that the PRA applies to governmental entities when they make rules,
but exempts these entities from the requirement of a TIA when the
entity acts pursuant to its enabling statute in preventing waste or
protecting the owner's rights of interest in groundwater. Since the
Authority adopted well-permitting rules pursuant to the EAA, an
enabling act that gave the Authority all of the powers, rights and
privileges necessary to manage, conserve, preserve and protect the
aquifer and to prevent the waste or pollution of water in the aquifer
the PRA did not apply.
Melissa L. Gordon
VERMONT
Cmty. Nat'l Bank v. State, 782 A.2d 1195 (Vt. 2001) (holding an
interest in condominium property constructed on lake landfill is
subject to Vermont's public trust doctrine).
Community National Bank and Newport Harbor Club
Condominium Association (collectively "National Bank") appealed a
superior courtjudgment in favor of the State of Vermont ("Vermont").
The superior court concluded National Bank held the condominium
property subject to the Vermont's public trust interest, and the
property's diminution in value was insufficient to estop Vermont's
interest.
In 1986, National Bank constructed condominiums on filled lands

